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 College Football Games and Crime 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that college football games can 
lead to aggressive and destructive behavior by fans.  However, to date, no 
empirical study has attempted to document the magnitude of this 
phenomenon.  We match daily data on offenses from the NIBRS to 26 
Division I-A college football programs in order to estimate the 
relationship between college football games and crime.  Our results 
suggest that the host community registers sharp increases in assaults, 
vandalism, arrests for disorderly conduct, and arrests for alcohol-related 
offenses on game days.  Upsets are associated with the largest increases in 
the number of expected offenses.  These estimates are discussed in the 
context of psychological theories of fan aggression.     
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Fierce fighting on the football field and in the streets of this town for two hours 
was the result this afternoon of the game…members and followers of both teams 
were cut by blows from clubs, bricks, canes, and any other weapons that were 
handy, townsfolk and students joining in the melee.  
 
--New York Times, Nov. 22, 1903 
 
Introduction 
College football is enormously popular in the United States, and there is evidence 
that its appeal is growing.  In 1998, college football games attracted 37.4 million 
spectators.  By 2006, attendance had risen to 47.9 million.1  Nineteen of the 20 largest 
stadiums located in the United States are devoted to the sport, and there are plans to 
expand the capacity at a number of college football stadiums in the coming years.2  
As the popularity of college football increases, so do concerns with regard to the 
behavior of its fans.  According to observers, the charged, “winner-take-all” atmosphere 
often leads to violent behavior and even riots (MacDonald 2004).  In an effort to 
discourage heavy drinking and “associated unruliness” during and after games, the 
majority of Division I-A schools currently prohibits stadium sales of alcoholic beverages 
(Wieberg 2005).  In August of 2005, the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) recommended that all schools ban the sale of alcohol at sporting events.   
Despite anecdotal reports that college football games lead to aggressive and 
violent behaviors among spectators, there has, to date, been no attempt to systematically 
document the phenomenon.  Moreover, there has been surprisingly little study of the 
                                                 
1
 These figures are provided by the National Collegiate Athletic Association.  See 
www.ncaa.org.stats/football/attendance.  
 
2
 Information on stadium capacity in the Unites States is available from Brown and Morrison (2007).   
Bunkley (2006) reported on plans to add seating to the University of Michigan’s football stadium, already 
the largest in the nation.  See also Raley (2007) and Wieberg (2007).   
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effect of other types of sporting events on such behaviors, although a number of 
psychological theories suggest that sporting events in general, and especially those that 
involve high levels of violence, might cause fans to act more aggressively than they 
would otherwise.     
In fact, previous empirical research provides only limited support for the 
hypothesis that sporting events are causally related to violent or aggressive acts.  For 
instance, Drake and Panday (1996) examined data on child abuse cases from Missouri in 
1992.  They found no evidence of a relationship between playoff games in the four major 
professional sports (baseball, basketball, football, and hockey) and reports of child abuse.  
Similarly, Sachs and Chu (2000) failed to find a statistically significant association 
between professional football games and domestic violence dispatches in the county of 
Los Angeles over a three-year period (1993-1995).  White et al. (1992) examined the 
relationship between games played by The Washington Redskins, a professional football 
team, and emergency room admissions at two hospitals in northern Virginia over a two-
year period (1988-1989).  One of the 2 hospitals recorded a statistically significant spike 
in emergency room visits by women the day after Redskin victories, but there was no 
evidence of a relationship between game days and emergency room admissions at the 
other hospital.  
Perhaps the best evidence of a link between sporting events and fan violence 
comes from two studies of prizefights and homicides.  Phillips (1983) collected 
information on eighteen championship heavyweight prizefights that took place during the 
period 1973-1978.  He found evidence that the U.S. homicide rate increased significantly 
3 days after a prizefight.  Miller et al. (1991) reanalyzed the data collected by Phillips 
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(1983), confirming this basic pattern of results.  Although the three-day lag suggests that 
the estimated relationship between prizefights and homicides could be spurious (Baron 
and Reiss 1985), the work of Phillips (1983) and Miller (1991) has been used to buttress 
the claim that individuals are capable of reacting quite violently to sporting events 
viewed on the television as opposed to in person.3  
Here, we examine daily offense data from 26 police agencies over the course of 6 
football seasons (2000 to 2005).  Each of these agencies had jurisdiction over a 
community in which a Division I-A college football team played its home games.  Our 
interest is in whether assaults and other offenses such as vandalism departed from their 
normal pattern on game days.  Specifically, we examine changes in the number of 
offenses reported by a particular police agency when the football program located in the 
community under its jurisdiction played a home game, and the change in offenses when 
the program played an away game.  In addition, we investigate whether the outcome of 
the game affects the estimated relationship between games days and offenses, and 
explore the role of team rank.  Finally, we experiment with introducing lags into the 
empirical model.   
Our results suggest that the host community registers sharp increases in assaults 
on game days.  In addition, there is evidence that vandalism, arrests for disorderly 
conduct, and alcohol-related arrests increase on game days, but no support for the 
hypothesis that away games are related to offenses.  The largest estimated effects are 
found when an upset occurs, defined as when an unranked team beat a ranked team or 
when a lower-ranked team beat a higher-ranked team. 
                                                 
3
 See, for instance, Wann et al. (2001, p. 117).  Felson (1996) provides a more critical appraisal of this body 
of work. 
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Some portion of the relationship between home games and offenses may be 
mechanical in nature, due to the fact that home games often attract a temporary, but 
substantial, influx of people from outside the host community.  However, the results with 
regard to upsets suggest that fans react to the outcome of games.  In the next section we 
discuss the potential links between sporting events and crime, paying special attention to 
the psychological theories of spectator aggression.   
 
Sporting Events, Aggression, and Drinking 
Clemson University is located in the small town of Clemson, South Carolina.  
Approximately 17,000 students attend Clemson University, and the town has a 
population of approximately 12,000.  Yet, Clemson Memorial Stadium, which can seat 
more than 80,000 football fans, is often filled to capacity.   
Obviously, college football games have the potential to draw thousands of 
spectators into relatively small communities.  As the number of individuals in a 
community increases, so too do the opportunities for disputes and altercations having 
nothing to do with football.  Our interest, however, goes beyond this sort of mechanical 
relationship.  If away games, which presumably do not draw many spectators from 
outside the local community, are associated with changes in the number of offenses 
reported, this would suggest a more complex relationship between sporting events and 
crime.  A similar argument could be made if the outcome of a game is found to affect the 
number of offenses. 
Several theories from psychology offer explanations for aggressive, even 
criminal, fan behavior.  For instance, Bandura (1973) posited that aggression can be 
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viewed as a response to environmental stimuli such as televised violence.  According to 
Bandura’s social learning theory, under the right circumstances, simply observing a 
sporting event can be enough to trigger an act of aggression, regardless of the outcome of 
the event.4  In contrast, the frustration-aggression hypothesis predicts that fans will react 
aggressively only when their favorite team loses.  According to the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis, first proposed by Dollard et al. (1939), acts of violence or aggression are the 
result of being thwarted in an effort to attain a goal.5  Cialdini et al. (1976), Branscombe 
and Wann (1992), and Wann (1993) also predicted that fans would be more likely to 
commit an aggressive or violent act in the event of a loss than in the event of a victory.  
Cialdini et al. (1976) described fans as attaching themselves to particular team, basking in 
the “reflected glory” of a victory, but reacting to a defeat almost as if they themselves had 
been on the field of play.  Branscombe and Wann (1992) and Wann (1993) focused on 
the negative shock to self-esteem experienced by the dedicated fan whose favorite team 
loses a game.  According to these authors, aggressive behavior after such a loss can be 
viewed as an attempt to recoup self-esteem.6   
                                                 
4
 See Bandura (2007) for a review of social learning theory.  Our discussion of the psychological theories 
of fan aggression also borrows from Wann et al. (2001), pp. 108-120.  Wann et al. (2001, p. 110), provided 
a hypothetical example illustrating social learning theory in the context of a sporting event: 
  
when a football fan sees his favorite player deliver an especially vicious 
hit on an opposing player and receive praise for doing so, the spectator 
might be inclined, given sufficient provocation, to model the same 
behavior on the obnoxious opposing team’s fan seated a few feat away.  
 
5
 For an in-depth discussion of the frustration-aggression hypothesis, see Berkowitz (1989).  Miller (1941) 
modified the frustration-aggression hypothesis, arguing that aggression is not the inevitable response to 
frustration. 
 
6
 Sociologists have also developed theories that can help explain spectator aggression.  These theories 
typically focus on how individuals modify their behavior when part of a larger group or crowd.  For 
instance, contagion theory posits that a single individual’s attitude or actions can be quickly and 
uncritically adopted by other members of a group (Wann et al. 2001, p. 120).   Simons and Taylor (1992) 
and Van Hiel et al. (2007) review the sociological theories of spectator aggression. 
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To date, few empirical studies have attempted to distinguish between the above 
theories.  Goldstein and Arms (1971) asked male spectators a series of questions designed 
to gauge their level of hostility before and after a game between the U.S. Military and 
Naval academies.  The authors found a comparable increase in hostility levels among 
fans of both the winning and losing teams, a result consistent with social learning theory 
but at odds with, for instance, the aggression-frustration hypothesis.  Arms et al. (1979), 
using a similar approach to that employed by Goldstein and Arms (1971), also found 
support for the social learning hypothesis.   
A number of researchers have explored the potentially pivotal role of alcohol 
consumption by fans.  Although a large body of research documents that alcohol 
consumption can lead to aggressive behavior, there is no consensus as to why (Bushman 
and Cooper 1990; Ito et al. 1996; Pederson et al. 2000).  There is, however, evidence that 
frustration intensifies the effect of alcohol on aggressive behavior (Ito et al. 1996), and 
speculation that, given certain triggers, intoxicated individuals will be more likely to 
exhibit what has been termed “displaced aggression” (Pederson et al. 2000).    
College football games are often accompanied by day-long parties and heavy 
drinking.  Neal and Fromme (2007) examined data collected from students attending The 
University of Texas at Austin.  They found that football game days were associated with 
substantial increases in the amount of alcohol consumed.  Similarly, Glassman et al. 
(2007) found that college football games days were associated with higher alcohol 
consumption than other “drinking occasions.”  
University administrators and NCAA committee members are clearly concerned 
about the problems caused by excessive drinking at sporting events.  In fact, all of the 
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football programs represented in our sample had banned the sale of alcohol in their 
stadiums before 2000.   
There is some evidence that banning alcohol can dampen the relationship between 
football games and aggressive fan behavior.  After the University of Colorado Boulder 
prohibited stadium alcohol sales, game-day arrests, assaults, and ejections decreased 
significantly (Bormann and Stone 2001).  Another study showed a decrease in game day 
drunk-driving arrests after Arizona State University implemented a ban on stadium sales 
of alcohol (Boyes and Faith 1993).  However, Spaite et al. (1990) found no change in the 
number of injuries or illnesses reported by medical aid stations after the consumption of 
alcohol was prohibited in the stadium of a popular collegiate football team.7  
 
The Data 
There are 119 Division I-A NCAA football programs in the United States.  We 
successfully matched daily offense data from the National Incident Based Reporting 
System (NIBRS) with 26 of these programs for the period 2000-2005.  The remaining 
programs were located in communities under the jurisdiction of a police agency that did 
not participate in the NIBRS data collection effort.8 
                                                 
7
 There is strong evidence of a causal link between alcohol consumption and crime outside of the university 
setting (Carpenter 2005; Saffer 2001; Joksch and Jones 1993).  For instance, Carpenter (2005) used the 
adoption of restrictive drunk-driving laws to estimate the effect of heavy alcohol use on nuisance crimes 
(vandalism, drunkenness, disorderly conduct).  Consistent with other research in this area, he found a 
decrease in these types of crime after these laws were implemented.   
 
8
 The NIBRS data are available from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data provided by the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).  According to the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, 5271 police agencies from 23 different states and representing 16% of the U.S. population were 
reporting incident-level crime data to the NIBRS as of December, 2003 
(www.ojp.gov/bjs/nibrsstatus.htm).   
The police agencies (and respective schools) included in the analysis are: Akron (The University 
of Akron), Ames (Iowa State University), Ann Arbor (The University of Michigan), Athens (Ohio 
University), Austin (The University of Texas at Austin), Blacksburg (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
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Our sample is composed of college football programs of varying sizes and ranks 
from across a large swath of the United States.  Table 1 presents descriptive information 
for the 26 programs examined.  Most were located in small- to medium-sized 
communities (population < 100,000), and most had stadiums that could seat between 30 
and 70 thousand spectators.  Eleven programs were located in the Midwest, 10 were 
located in the South, and 5 were located in the West.  Six  were ranked among the top 25 
football programs in the United States by the College Football Data Warehouse for the 
period 2000-2005, 15 were ranked outside the top 25, and 5 were unranked.   
College football teams typically start their seasons in late August or early 
September, and play their final regular-season games in late November or early 
December.  Championship games are played in early December.  With this schedule in 
mind, we analyzed offenses occurring between August 20 and December 10.9  Eighteen 
football programs in our sample were located in communities under the jurisdiction of an 
agency that reported daily offense data for the entire period under study.  Eight of the 26 
agencies provided data to the NIBRS for only a portion of this period.10     
                                                                                                                                                 
State University), Boise (Boise State University), Clemson (Clemson University), Colorado Springs 
(United States Air Force Academy), Columbia (The University of South Carolina), Columbus (The Ohio 
State University), Denton (The University of North Texas), East Lansing (Michigan State University), 
Fayetteville (University of Arkansas), Huntington (Marshall University), Iowa City (The University of 
Iowa), Jonesboro (Arkansas State University), Kalamazoo (Western Michigan University), Lawrence (The 
University of Kansas), Logan (Utah State University), Lubbock (Texas Tech University), Morgantown 
(West Virginia University), Moscow (The University of Idaho), Mount Pleasant (Eastern Michigan 
University), Murfreesboro (Middle Tennessee State University), and Provo (Brigham Young University).  
Although campus police agencies can report to the NIBRS, our focus is on the larger community.  Of the 
26 universities represented in our sample, 12 had campus police agencies that reported offense data to the 
NIBRS. 
 
9
 Bowl games, which typically take place in late December or early January, were not included in the 
analysis. 
 
10
 Ann Arbor did not provide data for the period 1/1/2000 – 12/31/2002; Austin did not provide data for the 
period 8/20/2004-12/31/2005; Akron did not provide data for the period 1/1/2000 – 12/31/2002); Columbus 
did not provide data for the period 1/1/2000-8/19/2004; Denton did not provide data for the period 1/1/2000 
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The final data set is composed of 14,926 agency-days.  A total of 1,516 football 
games are observed.11  Ninety-two percent of these games were played on a Saturday, but 
no game was played on 35 percent of the Saturday observations; 4.8 percent of the games 
took place on a Thursday, and 4.0 percent took place on other days of the week (Table 2).  
In the empirical analysis below, we exploit this variation to distinguish day-of-the-week 
effects from the effect of game days on two Group A offenses (for which incident data 
are available) and three Group B offenses (for which arrest data are available).  These 
offenses are listed below. 12 
 
Group A Offenses: 
 
Assaultit = assaults reported by agency i on day t.  
 
Vandalismit = vandalism offenses reported by agency i on day t. 
 
 
Group B Offenses: 
 
DUIit = arrests for driving under the influence reported by agency i on day t.  
 
Disorderlyit = arrests for disorderly conduct reported by agency i on day t. 
 
Liqour Lawit = arrests for liquor law violations reported by agency i on day t.13 
                                                                                                                                                 
– 12/31/2001; Fayetteville did not provide data for the period 1/1/2000 – 11/30/2003; Jonesboro did not 
provide data for the period 1/1/2000 – 8/19/2003; and Lawrence did not provide data for the period 
1/1/2000 – 12/31/2001. 
  
11
 Game data set were drawn from the College Football Data Warehouse website 
(www.cfbdatawarehouse.com).  Championship games are coded as away games because they typically take 
place in a neutral venue.  One hundred fifty-six games took place between football programs in the sample, 
and therefore appeared twice in the data: once as a home game for the football program located in the 
community in which the game was played, and once as an away game.  Deleting these games from the data 
has no appreciable effect on the results reported below.  
 
12
 Table 1 of the appendix provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.   
 
13
 According to the Federal Register (April 29, 1994) liquor law offenses include, “maintaining unlawful 
drinking places; bootlegging, operating a still; furnishing liquor to a minor or intemperate person; using a 
vehicle for illegal transportation of liquor; drinking on a train or public conveyance; and all attempts to 
commit any of the aforementioned.”  
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 Figure 1 shows the mean number of assaults by day of the week and whether a 
home or away game was played.   It provides some support for the hypothesis that 
aggressive behavior, as measured by assaults, increased when the community under the 
jurisdiction of agency i hosted a college football game.14  Figures 2-5 document a similar 
pattern for vandalism and the Group B offenses.15  Taken together, Figures 1-5 suggest 
that college football games may in fact encourage fans to engage in a variety of unlawful 
behaviors.  The next section introduces a more formal empirical strategy.   
    
Estimation 
We estimate a negative binomial regression model as described by, for instance, 
Cameron and Trivedi (1986) and Grootendorst (2002), in which the number of offenses 
reported, yit, is related to whether a college football game was played by the following 
equation:  
 
(1)    ,')(ln 10 itiitititit vAwayHomeyE εβδδα +++++= X  
 
where Homeit is equal to 1 if the football program located in the community under agency 
i’s jurisdiction played a home game on day t (and equal to 0 otherwise), and Awayit is 
equal to 1 if the program located in the community under agency i’s jurisdiction played 
                                                 
14
 For instance, on average, 6.74 assaults were reported on Saturdays when a home game was played, as 
compared to an average of 5.95 assaults on Saturdays when no game was played.   It might be noted, 
however, that the difference between these figures is not statistically different at conventional levels. 
 
15
 For instance, on average, there were 2.58 arrests for disorderly conduct on Saturdays when a home game 
was played, as compared to an average of 2.22 arrests on Saturdays when no game was played. 
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an away game on day t (and equal to 0 otherwise); Xit includes controls for Thanksgiving 
and Labor Day, as well as controls for day of the week, holiday weekends, month, and 
year; vi is a vector of agency fixed effects which capture the influence of time-invariant 
factors such as region; and exp(εit) follows a gamma distribution with mean of 1 and 
variance σ.  If σ is assumed to equal 0, then the negative binomial reduces to the Poisson 
regression model, which is designed, and commonly used, for count data (Grootendorst 
2002).  However, because the hypothesis σ = 0 was consistently rejected at the .01 level, 
we employed the negative binomial regression model.    
 
The Results 
Estimated negative binomial regression coefficients are reported in Table 3.  Our 
interest is on the relationship between game days and the number of offenses reported in 
the NIBRS.  Although not shown, controls for Thanksgiving, Labor Day, day of the 
week, holiday weekends, month, and year are included.16  Agency fixed effects are also 
included as covariates.  
There is no evidence that playing an away game influences the expected number 
offenses reported by agency i. 
 
However, home games are associated with a 9 percent 
increase in assaults (e.086 =1.090), our best measure of aggressive behavior, and are 
associated with an 18 percent increase in vandalism (e.161 = 1.175).17   
                                                 
16
 The full results are provided in Table 2 of the appendix. 
 
17
 If b is the estimated negative binomial coefficient, then [exp(b) -1] x 100 can be interpreted as the 
average percent change in E(yit)  from a one unit change in xit, the covariate of interest.  In the case of 
assaults, the estimated binomial coefficient of Homeit is 0.086, and (e.086 -1) x 100 = 9.0.  In the case of 
vandalism, the estimated binomial coefficient of Homeit is 0.161, and (e.161 -1) x 100 = 17.5.   Although 
Tables 3-7 present estimated negative binomial coefficients, these coefficients are converted to percent 
changes when the results are discussed in the text. 
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There is also evidence of a relationship between home games and the number of 
Group B offenses reported.  Specifically, home games are associated with a 13 percent 
increase in arrests for drunk driving, a 41 percent increase in arrests for disorderly 
conduct, and a 76 percent increase in arrests for liquor law violations. 
The results presented in Table 3 strongly suggest that, in keeping with news 
reports and other anecdotal evidence, college football games impose a cost on the host 
community in the form of additional crime.  We now address the question of whether the 
magnitude of this cost can be predicted by the outcome of the game.  
According to social learning theory, the relationship between and sporting events 
and aggression is the result of fans mimicking violence on the field.  The outcome of the 
contest should have no appreciable impact.  Likewise, if the results presented in Table 3 
are entirely driven by game-day surges in population, we would expect the outcome of 
the contest to be irrelevant.  In contrast, according to the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis, we should observe the strongest relationship between game days and offenses 
in the event of a loss.   
 Our first step in exploring whether the outcome of a game impacts the number of 
offenses reported is to replace the variables Homeit and Awayit in equation (1) with four 
mutually exclusive indicator variables defined as follows: 
 
 
Home Game Winit  = 1 if the program located in the community under agency i’s  
                                   jurisdiction won a home game on day t, and = 0 otherwise. 
 
Home Game Lossit = 1 if the program located in the community under agency i’s 
                                   jurisdiction lost a home game on day t, and = 0 otherwise. 
 
Away Game Winit   = 1 if the program located in the community under agency i’s  
                                   jurisdiction won an away game on day t, and = 0 otherwise. 
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Away Game Lossit = 1 if the program located in the community under agency i’s  
                                  jurisdiction lost an away game on day t, and = 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 4.  The estimated negative 
binomial coefficients of Away Game Winit and Away Game Lossit are never statistically 
significant at conventional levels, a pattern of results that leads us to focus on home 
games, where there is evidence that losses lead to larger increases in the number of 
offenses than wins.  For instance, home game losses are associated with a 12 percent 
increase in assaults, but home game wins are associated with only an 8 percent increase 
in assaults.  To take another example, home game losses are associated with a 24 percent 
increase in DUIs, but home game wins are associated with only a 10 percent increase in 
DUIs.  
These estimates suggest that neither social learning theory nor temporary game-
day surges in population can fully explain the relationship between college football 
games and offenses.  However, the results presented in Table 4 are far from definitive.  In 
fact, in 4 out of 5 cases we cannot reject the hypothesis that estimated negative binomial 
coefficient of Home Game Lossit is equal to the estimated coefficient of Home Game 
Winit.  Losses at home are associated with more arrests for DUI than wins at the .10 level. 
 Every Sunday during the college football season, the Associated Press publishes a 
ranking of the top 25 football programs in the United States.  It is based on voting by 65 
sportswriters and broadcasters from across the country, and is updated weekly.18  In an 
effort to further explore the relationship between home games and offenses documented 
                                                 
18 The data are available at: www.appollarchive.com/football/index. 
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in Tables 3 and 4, we used the Associated Press rankings to distinguish upsets from other 
possible outcomes.   
An upset win was defined has having occurred if the program located in the 
jurisdiction of agency i was unranked and beat a program ranked in the top 25 on day t, 
or if the program located in the jurisdiction of agency i beat a higher-ranked team on day 
t.  An upset loss was defined as having occurred when the program located in the 
jurisdiction of agency i was ranked in the top 25 and was beaten by an unranked program 
on day t, or the program located in the jurisdiction of agency i was beaten by a lower-
ranked team on day t.   
Table 5 presents estimates of (1) modified so that the effect of upsets at home on 
offenses can be distinguished from the effect of other possible outcomes.19  Although not 
shown, away-games are also divided into upsets and non-upsets.20   
Turning first to the Group A offenses, there is evidence that upsets lead to larger 
increases in assaults and vandalism than non-upsets.  Expected assaults more than double 
with an upset loss at home, and increase by 36 percent with an upset victory.  In contrast, 
                                                 
19
 It might be noted that, by definition, games that resulted in an upset involved at least one ranked football 
program, and as a consequence might have generated more interest and drawn more spectators than games 
between two unranked teams.  In order to control for this phenomenon, we include ten additional variables 
in Xit.  The first five are based on the ranking of the football program located in the jurisdiction of agency i: 
an indicator equal to 1 on game day if the program was ranked in the top 5, and equal to 0 otherwise; an 
indicator equal to 1 on game day if the program was ranked 6-10, and equal to 0 otherwise; an indicator 
equal to 1 on game day if the program was ranked 11-15, and equal to 0 otherwise; an indicator equal to 1 
on game day if the program was ranked 16-20, and equal to 0 otherwise; and an indicator equal to 1 on 
game day if the program was ranked 21-25, and equal to 0 otherwise.  We also include five measures of the 
opponent’s ranking: an indicator equal to 1 on game day if the opponent was ranked in the top 5, and equal 
to 0 otherwise; an indicator equal to 1 on game day if the opponent was ranked 6-10, and equal to 0 
otherwise; an indicator equal to 1 on game day if the opponent was ranked 11-15, and equal to 0 otherwise; 
an indicator equal to 1 on game day if the opponent was ranked 16-20, and equal to 0 otherwise; and an 
indicator equal to 1 on game day if the opponent was ranked 21-25, and equal to 0 otherwise.  Allowing for 
interactions between these sets of ranking measures produced similar results to those reported in Table 5.  
 
20
 With two exceptions, the away-game estimates are not statistically significant.  Away game upset wins 
are associated with a 43 percent increase in vandalism reported by agency i, and away game upset losses 
are associated with a 27 percent decrease in vandalism.  
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non-upset losses at home are associated with a (statistically insignificant) 6 percent 
increase in assaults, and non-upset wins are associated with a 7 percent increase.21   
 The results for vandalism exhibit a similar pattern.  Expected vandalism increases 
by 61 percent with an upset loss at home, and by 46 percent with an upset win.  Games 
played at home that did not produce an upset are associated with statistically significant, 
but much smaller increases in vandalism.22 
 The Group B results provide additional evidence that fan reactions are much 
stronger when upsets occurred.  Expected arrests for disorderly conduct more than double 
with an upset loss at home, and increase by 93 percent with an upset victory; non-upset 
losses at home are associated with a (statistically insignificant) 20 percent increase in 
arrests for disorderly conduct, and non-upset wins are associated with a 25 percent 
increase in arrests for disorderly conduct.23  Expected DUIs increase by 77 percent with 
an upset win at home, and by 57 with an upset loss; non-upset wins at home are 
associated with a (statistically insignificant) 5 percent increase in DUIs, and non-upset 
                                                 
21
 The hypothesis that upsets at home had the same effect on assaults as games at home that did not produce 
an upset is easily rejected.  The hypothesis that upset losses at home had the same effect on assaults as 
upset wins at home is rejected ( p-value = 0.01), as is the hypothesis that upset wins at home had the same 
effect as non-upset losses (p-value = 0.03). 
 
22
 The hypothesis that upsets at home had the same effect on vandalism as games at home that did not 
produce an upset is rejected at the .01 level.  However, the hypothesis that upset losses at home had the 
same effect on vandalism as upset wins at home cannot be rejected at conventional levels. 
 
23
 The hypothesis that upsets at home had the same effect on arrests for disorderly conduct as games at 
home that did not produce an upset is rejected at the .01 level.  However, the hypothesis that upset losses at 
home had the same effect on arrests for disorderly conduct as upset wins at home cannot be rejected (p-
value = 0.42).  
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losses are associated with a 22 percent increase.24  Likewise, expected arrests for liquor 
law violations are highest in the event of an upset win or loss.25 
Finally, in Table 6 we explore whether the closeness of the game can predict the 
number of offenses reported.  Specifically, we divide home games into those in which the 
opponents were separated by eight points or less, and those in which the opponents were 
separated by more than eight points.26   
The results occasionally lend support to the hypothesis that the closeness of the 
outcome matters.  For instance, expected assaults increase by 12 percent with a close 
home game win, but increase by only 5 percent when the win was not close.  The results 
for vandalism, disorderly conduct, and liquor law violations exhibit a similar pattern.  
However, only in the case of disorderly conduct are the differences between close games 
and games decided by more than eight points statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  Experiments in which a close game was defined as one in which the opponents 
were separated by three points or less yielded very similar results.  
 
Lagged Effects 
Because previous authors such as Phillips (1983) and Miller et al. (1991) have 
argued that a sporting event can impact behavior days after it takes place, we introduce 
lagged values of the game variables to our analysis in Table 7.  Specifically, we examine 
                                                 
24
 The hypothesis that upsets at home had the same effect on arrests for DUI as games at home that did not 
produce an upset is rejected at the .01 level.   However, the hypothesis that upset wins at home had the 
same effect on arrests for DUI as upset losses at home cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.65). 
 
25However, the hypothesis that upsets at home had the same effect on arrests for liquor law violations as 
games at home that did not produce an upset cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.30).    
 
26
 Although not shown, away games are also divided based on closeness.   The away-game estimates are 
never statistically significant at conventional levels. 
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the effect of upsets and non-upsets at home with lags of one and two days.  Again, our 
focus is on home games because up to this point in the analysis there has been little 
evidence that an away game played by the football program located in agency i's 
jurisdiction impacts the number of offenses reported by agency i.  
Table 7 presents estimated negative binomial coefficients from a model with lags, 
and, for the purposes of comparison, estimated coefficients from a model without lags 
(originally presented in Table 4).  In general, there is little support for the hypothesis that 
football games affect the number of offenses committed beyond the actual day they take 
place, although there is evidence that expected vandalism increases by 42 percent the day 
after an upset loss, and expected liquor law violations increased by 34 percent the day 
after a non-upset loss.  These results raise the possibility that games may, under certain 
circumstances, affect the behavior of fans the beyond midnight and into the following 
day.   
 
Robustness Checks 
 A number of robustness checks were conducted.  For instance, we interacted day 
of the week with the month indicators, and, in separate regressions, we controlled for 
agency-specific linear trends by interacting agency and year with a variable equal to 1 in 
August, 2 in September, 3 in October, and so forth.  None of these experiments produced 
results qualitatively different from those discussed above.  In addition, we created three 
region variables (Midwest, Southwest, Southeast), which were interacted with the day of 
the week and month indicators.  Again, the negative binomial estimates were 
qualitatively equivalent to those reported above.   
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Estimates of the standard Poisson model produced results that were consistent in 
terms of magnitude with those presented in Tables 3-7, but the estimated standard errors 
were typically much smaller.  Previous researchers (see, for instance, Cameron and 
Trivedi 1986) have shown that estimated standard errors from a Poisson regression are 
biased downwards in the presence of overdispersion ( that is, when the conditional mean 
of the count variable is different than the conditional variance).  Tests clearly indicated 
the presence of overdispersion for all five of the offenses considered.27  
Restricting the sample to only those football programs that were ranked in the top 
25 by the Associated Press at some point during the period 2000-2005 produced results 
that were very similar to those presented in Tables 3-7.  Estimated negative binomial 
coefficients for the 11 programs that were never ranked during this period were much less 
precise, but nevertheless were of similar magnitude to those presented in Tables 3-7.  
This pattern of results suggests that the estimates in Tables 3-7 are not being driven by a 
small subset of programs that are perennially ranked.    
 
Conclusion  
Our analysis provides evidence that college football games lead to increases in 
assaults and vandalism.  Home games are associated with a 9 percent increase in assaults, 
our best measure of aggressive behavior, and an 18 percent increase in vandalism.  For 
the typical agency in our sample, these estimates would translate into an additional 0.5 
reports of assault and an additional report of vandalism on a Saturday when a home 
game was played as compared to a Saturday when no game was played. 
                                                 
27
 Overdispersion is indicated if the hypothesis σ = 0 cannot be rejected, where σ is the variance of exp(εit) 
from (1).  See Grootendorst (2002).  
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It could easily be argued that these effects, although precisely estimated, are quite 
modest in terms of magnitude.  However, we find that upset losses and wins can lead to 
much larger increases in these types of offenses.  According to our estimates, expected 
assaults increase by 112 percent with an upset loss at home, and by 36 percent with an 
upset victory.  For the typical agency in our sample this would translate into an additional 
6.7 reports of assault in the case of an upset loss on a Saturday, and an additional 2.2 
reports of assault in the case of an upset win.  An upset loss at home on a Saturday is 
associated with an additional 3.4 reports of vandalism; an upset loss at home is associated 
with an additional 2.6 reports of vandalism.  
The fact that upsets lead to substantially larger increases in assaults and vandalism 
than non-upsets suggests that social learning theory, which posits that fans are simply 
mimicking the violence they view on the field, cannot by itself explain why college 
football and aggressive/destructive behaviors are connected.  In addition, the results with 
regard to upsets can be seen as evidence against the hypothesis that temporary surges in 
population on game days are the sole factor behind the positive relationship between 
offenses and home games. 
Moreover, our results are not entirely consistent with explanations of fan 
aggression that predict that fans will be more likely to react aggressively to a loss than to 
a win (Dollard et al. 1939; Cialdini et al. 1976; Branscombe and Wann 1992; Wann 
1993).   For instance, if fan aggression at football games were simply the result of 
frustration, then games in which the home team won in an upset (where presumably more 
spectators were rooting for the home team than for the visiting team) would be associated 
with fewer assaults than non-upset losses at home.  However, the data clearly reject this 
  
20  
hypothesis.  Although there is evidence that upset losses are associated with a larger 
increase in assaults than are upset wins, our results clearly indicate that expectations, and 
what happens to fans’ behavior when they are not met, should be explicitly built into 
future attempts to model the relationship between aggression and sporting events.   
Finally, our results indicate that college football games lead to increased arrests 
for alcohol-related offenses and disorderly conduct (the Group B offenses).  Home games 
are associated with a 13 percent increase in arrests for drunk driving, a 41 percent 
increase in arrests for disorderly conduct, and a 76 percent increase in arrests for liquor 
law violations.    
Again, in the event of an upset, these figures can be much larger.  For instance, 
upset losses are associated with a 162 percent increase in arrests for disorderly conduct, 
and upset wins are associated with a 93 percent increase in arrests for disorderly conduct.   
For the typical agency in our sample, these figures correspond to an additional 1.5 arrests 
for disorderly conduct in the event of a Saturday upset loss, and an additional 0.9 arrests 
for disorderly conduct in the event of an upset win.  
The relationship between home games and arrests may, in part, be due to 
communities choosing to provide extra police protection on game days.  However, if this 
were the only mechanism at work, then it is unlikely that game outcomes such as upsets 
would be related to the number of Group B offenses.  The fact that expected arrests for 
alcohol-related offenses and disorderly conduct are much higher in the event of upset 
wins than in the event of non-upsets suggests that fans may be engaging celebratory 
drinking.  Recent work by Carpenter (2005) strongly suggests that alcohol consumption 
is causally related to crimes such as vandalism and disorderly conduct.  Given this result, 
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it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the relationship between college football 
games and aggressive behavior is entirely driven by alcohol consumption.   
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Table 1. 
Characteristics of Schools/Football Programs in Sample 
   
Number 
Region 
Southeast 7 
Midwest 11 
Southwest 3 
West 5 
Northeast 0 
   
Community Population 
<50,000 9 
50,000-100,000 7 
100,000-
200,000 
4 
200,000-
500,000 
4 
>500,000 2 
   
Stadium Size 
<30,000 2 
30,000-50,000 9 
50,000-70,000 7 
70,000-90,000 6 
>90,000 2 
   
Ranking (2000-2006) 
1-25 6 
25-50 6 
50-75 4 
75-125 5 
Not ranked 5 
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Table 2. 
Distribution of Game days by Day of the Week 
 
Day of Week 
 
Games 
 
 Observations 
Saturday 1382 2138 
Sunday 5 2132 
Monday 1 2133 
Tuesday 7 2135 
Wednesday 12 2137 
Thursday 73 2113 
Friday 36 2138 
   
 Total 
 
1516 
 
14926 
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Table 3. College Football Games and Number of Offenses 
 
 
 
 
Assaults 
 
Vandalism 
 
DUIs 
Disorderly 
Conduct 
Liquor Law 
Violations 
 
Home Game 0.086*** 0.161*** 0.126*** 0.346*** 0.566*** 
  
(0.027) (0.032) (0.040) (0.072) (0.077) 
 
Away Game 0.007 0.025 0.017 -0.002 -0.051 
  
(0.027) (0.033) (0.041) (0.075) (0.079) 
    
  
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
  
Observations   14926 14926 14926 14926 14926 
Groups 26 26 26 
 
26 
 
26 
 
Log Likelihood 
 
-27755.23 -28259.54 -16959.61 -15035.21 -18973.57 
 
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.10 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients from a negative binomial regression model are reported. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.   Although not shown, controls for day of the week, Thanksgiving, Labor Day, holiday weekends, 
month, and year are included.  The full results are reported in Table 2 of the appendix. 
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Table 4.  Winning vs. Losing 
 
 
Assaults 
 
Vandalism 
 
DUIs 
Disorderly 
Conduct 
Liquor Law 
Violations 
 
Home Game Win 0.077*** 0.150*** 0.094** 0.345*** 0.619*** 
 
(0.029) (0.036) (0.043) (0.079) (0.085) 
 
Home Game Loss 0.109*** 0.186*** 0.212*** 0.351*** 0.442*** 
 
(0.042) (0.049) (0.061) (0.104) (0.111) 
 
Away Game Win 0.014 0.029 0.024 -0.083 0.017 
 
(0.036) (0.043) (0.052) (0.100) (0.105) 
 
Away Game Loss 0.001 0.022 0.012 0.054 -0.099 
 
(0.033) (0.039) (0.049) (0.087) (0.092) 
 
     
 Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations   14926 14926 14926 14926 14926 
 
Groups 26 26 26 
 
26 
 
26 
 
Log Likelihood -27754.91 -28259.29 -16957.90 
 
-15034.46 
 
-18971.97 
 
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.10 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients from a negative binomial regression model are reported. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.   Although not shown, controls for day of the week, Thanksgiving, Labor Day, holiday weekends, 
month, and year are included.   
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Table 5.  The Relationship between Upsets and Number of Offenses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assaults 
 
Vandalism 
 
DUIs 
Disorderly 
Conduct 
Liquor Law 
Violations 
Home Game Upset Win 0.308*** 0.376*** 0.572*** 0.656*** 0.782*** 
 
(0.112) (0.127) (0.136) (0.234) (0.266) 
Non-Upset Home Game Win 0.063** 0.108*** 0.046 0.224*** 0.419*** 
 
(0.032) (0.039) (0.047) (0.086) (0.094) 
 
     
Home Game Upset Loss 0.755*** 0.476*** 0.451* 0.963*** 0.263 
 
(0.141) (0.182) (0.243) (0.331) (0.376) 
Non-Upset Home Game Loss 0.057 0.137*** 0.202*** 0.182 0.375*** 
 
(0.045) (0.052) (0.065) (0.112) (0.119) 
 
     
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations   14926 14926 14926 14926 14926 
 
Groups 26 26 26 
 
26 
 
26 
 
Log Likelihood -27734.19 -28240.85 -16944.42 
 
-15014.53 
 
-18952.48 
 
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.10 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients from a negative binomial regression model are reported. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.   Although not shown, controls for day of the week, Thanksgiving, Labor Day, holiday weekends, 
month, and year are included.  Also included are indicators for away-game outcomes. 
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Table 6.  Close Games vs. Games Decided by More than 8 Points 
 
Assaults Vandalism DUIs Disorderly Conduct 
Liquor Law 
Violations 
 
Home Game Win Decided by ≤ 8 0.112** 0.142** 0.181** 0.502*** 0.634*** 
 
(0.054) (0.067) (0.082) (0.138) (0.149) 
Home Game Win Decided by > 8 0.050 0.125*** 0.048 0.169* 0.391*** 
 
(0.034) (0.041) (0.049) (0.090) (0.099) 
 
Home Game Loss Decided by ≤ 8 0.127** 0.128* 0.189** 0.374*** 0.275* 
 
(0.055) (0.066) (0.082) (0.137) (0.151) 
Home Game Loss Decided by > 8 0.045 0.147** 0.184** 0.050 0.432*** 
 
(0.060) (0.068) (0.085) (0.149) (0.150) 
 
     
 Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations   14926 14926 14926 14926 14926 
 
Groups 26 26 26 
 
26 
 
26 
 
Log Likelihood -27746.35 -28246.61 -16950.79 
 
-15013.87 
 
-18951.48 
 
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.10 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients from a negative binomial regression model are reported. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.   Although not shown, controls for day of the week, Thanksgiving, Labor Day, holiday weekends, month, 
and year are included.  Also included are indicators for away-game outcomes. 
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Table 7.  Adding Lags to the Model. 
 
 
Assaults 
 
Vandalism 
 
    
Home Game Upset Wint 0.308*** 0.255** 0.376*** 0.326** 
 
(0.112) (0.116) (0.127) (0.132) 
Home Game Upset Wint-1  0.113  0.171 
 
 (0.096)  (0.108) 
Home Game Upset Wint-2  0.056  0.008 
 
 (0.080)  (0.103) 
 
    
Non-Upset Home Game Wint 0.063** 0.025 0.108*** 0.059 
 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.039) (0.046) 
Non-Upset Home Game Wint-1  0.013  0.044 
 
 (0.041)  (0.049) 
Non-Upset Home Game Wint-2  0.016  -0.007 
 
 (0.036)  (0.044) 
 
    
Home Game Upset Losst 0.755*** 0.692*** 0.476*** 0.423** 
 
(0.141) (0.145) (0.182) (0.185) 
Home Game Upset Losst-1  -0.003  0.349** 
 
 (0.115)  (0.142) 
Home Game Upset Losst-2  0.071  -0.062 
 
 (0.132)  (0.153) 
 
    
Non-Upset Home Game Losst 0.057 0.023 0.137*** 0.090 
 
(0.045) (0.049) (0.052) (0.057) 
Non-Upset Home Game Losst-1  0.017  0.071 
 
 (0.049)  (0.059) 
Non-Upset Home Game Losst-2  0.057  -0.017 
 
 (0.045)  (0.056) 
 
    
Agency Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
     
Observations    14926  14926 
     
Groups  26  26 
     
Log Likelihood  -27719.3  -28213.88 
     
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.10 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients from a negative binomial regression model are 
reported. Standard errors are in parentheses.   Although not shown, controls for 
day of the week, Thanksgiving, Labor Day, holiday weekends, month, and year are 
included.  Also included are indicators for away-game outcomes with lags. 
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Table 7 (continued).  Adding Lags to the Model 
 
 
 
DUIs 
 
 
Disorderly Conduct 
 
Liquor Law 
Violations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home Game Upset Wint 0.572*** 0.531*** 0.656*** 0.545** 0.782*** 0.661** 
 
(0.136) (0.144) (0.234) (0.250) (0.266) (0.289) 
Home Game Upset Wint-1  0.189  -0.102  0.009 
 
 (0.134)  (0.265)  (0.273) 
Home Game Upset Wint-2  -0.207  -0.276  -0.396 
 
 (0.137)  (0.240)  (0.270) 
 
      
Non-Upset Home Game Wint 0.046 0.007 0.224*** 0.126 0.419*** 0.258* 
 
(0.047) (0.057) (0.086) (0.113) (0.094) (0.136) 
Non-Upset Home Game Wint-1  0.082  0.198  0.260* 
 
 (0.064)  (0.122)  (0.151) 
Non-Upset Home Game Wint-2  -0.035  -0.010  -0.120 
 
 (0.063)  (0.105)  (0.122) 
 
      
Home Game Upset Losst 0.451* 0.385 0.963*** 0.840** 0.263 -0.010 
 
(0.243) (0.248) (0.331) (0.347) (0.376) (0.394) 
Home Game Upset Losst-1  -0.012  0.432  0.162 
 
 (0.158)  (0.290)  (0.389) 
Home Game Upset Losst-2  -0.160  -0.430  -0.349 
 
 (0.183)  (0.391)  (0.354) 
 
      
Non-Upset Home Game Losst 0.202*** 0.159** 0.182 0.087 0.375*** 0.216 
 
(0.065) (0.072) (0.112) (0.135) (0.119) (0.156) 
Non-Upset Home Game Losst-1  0.088  0.031  0.292* 
 
 (0.074)  (0.143)  (0.169) 
Non-Upset Home Game Losst-2  0.021  -0.073  -0.008 
 
 (0.074)  (0.125)  (0.143) 
 
      
Agency Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations    14926  14926  14926 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groups  26  26  26 
 
 
 
    
Log Likelihood  -16933.28  -14997.25  -18922.09 
 
 
 
    
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.10 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients from a negative binomial regression model are reported. Standard errors are 
in parentheses.   Although not shown, controls for day of the week, Thanksgiving, Labor Day, holiday 
weekends, month, and year are included.  Also included are indicators for away-game outcomes with lags. 
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Figure 1. Mean Assaults 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean Vandalism Offenses 
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Figure 3.  Mean Arrests for DUI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Mean Arrests for Disorderly Conduct  
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Figure 5.  Mean Arrests for Liquor Law Violations 
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Appendix Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Count Variables 
 All days No game Home game Away game 
Assaults 5.32 5.21 6.63 6.00 
 (10.07) (9.90) (12.30) (10.42) 
   0.25 quantile 0 0 1 1 
   0.50 quantile 2 2 2 2 
   0.75 quantile 6 6 7 7 
   0.90 quantile 13 12 15 15 
 
Vandalism 
 
4.87 
 
4.73 
 
6.62 
 
5.73 
 (11.11) (11.00) (12.98) (10.88) 
   0.25 quantile 0 0 1 1 
   0.50 quantile 2 2 3 2 
   0.75 quantile 5 4 7 6 
   0.90 quantile 11 11 15 15 
 
DUIs 
 
1.35 
 
1.24 
 
2.49 
 
2.26 
 (2.63) (2.42) (3.86) (3.95) 
   0.25 quantile 0 0 0 0 
   0.50 quantile 0 1 1 1 
   0.75 quantile 2 1 3 3 
   0.90 quantile 4 3 7 6 
 
Disorderly Conduct 
 
0.77 
 
0.72 
 
1.36 
 
1.01 
 (1.51) (1.42) (2.21) (1.93) 
   0.25 quantile 0 0 0 0 
   0.50 quantile 0 0 0 0 
   0.75 quantile 1 1 2 1 
   0.90 quantile 2 2 4 3 
 
Liquor law violations 
 
1.62 
 
1.39 
 
4.99 
 
2.35 
 (4.65) (3.94) (11.00) (4.31) 
   0.25 quantile 0 0 0 0 
   0.50 quantile 0 0 1 1 
   0.75 quantile 1 1 5 3 
   0.90 quantile 4 4 13 7 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 Appendix Table 2. College Football Games and Offenses, Full Results 
 
Assaults Vandalism DUIs Disorderly Conduct 
Liquor Law 
Violations 
 
Home Game 0.086*** 0.161*** 0.126*** 0.346*** 0.566*** 
  
(0.027) (0.032) (0.040) (0.072) (0.077) 
Away Game 0.007 0.025 0.017 -0.002 -0.051 
  
(0.027) (0.033) (0.041) (0.075) (0.079) 
Labor day 0.206*** 0.152** 0.311*** 0.578*** 1.287*** 
 
(0.055) (0.071) (0.110) (0.156) (0.165) 
Thanksgiving -0.070 -0.097 0.300*** 0.125 -0.140 
 
(0.061) (0.075) (0.091) (0.175) (0.192) 
Holiday weekend -0.055** -0.097*** -0.065* -0.197*** -0.298*** 
 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.033) (0.060) (0.061) 
Tuesday 0.036* -0.096*** 0.065 0.173*** 0.094*** 
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.040) (0.056) (0.067) 
Wednesday 0.031 -0.047** 0.251*** 0.177*** 0.417*** 
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.038) (0.057) (0.064) 
Thursday 0.066*** -0.029 0.573*** 0.309*** 0.831*** 
 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.037) (0.056) (0.063) 
Friday 0.160*** 0.267*** 0.878*** 0.687*** 1.504*** 
 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.035) (0.054) (0.061) 
Saturday 0.296*** 0.348*** 1.204*** 0.788*** 1.730*** 
 
(0.024) (0.029) (0.041) (0.068) (0.074) 
Sunday 0.307*** 0.258*** 0.968*** 0.776*** 1.422*** 
 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.035) (0.053) (0.061) 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued). College Football Games and Offenses, Full Results  
 
Assaults Vandalism DUIs Disorderly Conduct 
Liquor Law 
Violations 
2001 -0.054*** 0.095*** -0.179*** -0.068 -0.257*** 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.029) (0.052) (0.055) 
2002 0.067*** 0.193*** 0.125*** 0.153*** -0.016 
 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.027) (0.049) (0.053) 
2003 0.043** 0.198*** 0.033 0.113** 0.042 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.030) (0.050) (0.053) 
2004 0.163*** 0.175*** 0.109*** 0.276*** -0.032 
 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.029) (0.049) (0.053) 
2005 0.131*** 0.164*** 0.118*** 0.359*** 0.032 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.029) (0.049) (0.053) 
August 0.046*** -0.041* 0.080*** 0.183*** 0.799*** 
 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.030) (0.047) (0.050) 
September 0.070*** -0.024 0.035 0.144*** 0.365*** 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.022) (0.036) (0.039) 
November -0.089*** -0.063*** -0.028 -0.231*** -0.260*** 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.038) (0.042) 
December -0.125*** -0.206*** -0.018 -0.420*** -0.485*** 
 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.032) (0.057) (0.062) 
 
     
Agency Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations   14926 14926 14926 14926 14926 
Groups 26 26 26 26 26 
Log Likelihood -27755.23 -28259.54 -16959.61 -15035.21 -18973.57 
***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.10 
Notes: Estimated coefficients from a negative binomial regression model are reported. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.   
 
